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Following the Second World War, as the United States emerged victorious alongside
the Soviet Union, the American government reassessed foreign relations to determine friends
and foes. The subsequent bipolar power struggle between the Soviet Union and the United
States compelled the world’s nations to identify with either the Soviets or the Americans. In
Europe, the divide occurred geographically, pitting the East against the West. In the West,
France and the United Kingdom surfaced as the region’s most influential representatives of
the American camp. The onset of the Cold War forced the United States to adapt its
preexisting wartime relationships with Britain and France for the new demands of American
Cold War strategy.
American Cold War strategy required allies who safeguarded U.S. interests abroad.
Britain and France were optimal choices for this requirement. The United Kingdom held the
key to overseas nuclear and military endeavors while France championed itself as the leader
of an integrated Europe. Together, France and Britain upheld U.S. containment policy but did
not care to share the spotlight as America’s sidekick. On one hand, the United Kingdom felt it
was America’s natural partner and would not accept anything short of preferential treatment.
On the other hand, France desired to establish itself as an independent, prominent power and
refused to concede second place to Britain. The United States attempted to appease both
governments without offending either. Through foreign policy the United States awarded
preferential status to the British meanwhile reassuring the French of their value to preserving
Western superiority. This careful balance of power between the United Kingdom and France,
however, sometimes created unexpected conflicts that offset the American agenda and
affected policymaking throughout the duration of the Cold War. The United States and
Britain prioritized each other, and the enduring strength of the special relationship ultimately
weakened the French relationship with both countries. Consequently, these Cold War
relationships have had a lasting impact on international relations. By exploring the Anglo-
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American and Franco-American relationships from the Second World War through 1972,
when Britain joined the European Community (EC), we will evaluate the relationships in the
contexts of European integration; collective defense, nuclear cooperation, and intelligence
sharing; and the test of friendship through international conflicts.
Rebuilding Europe
Prior to the Cold War, the United States shared a long history with France and the
United Kingdom characterized by both discord and harmony within the scope of foreign
relations. The World Wars tested the American relationship with both countries. U.S. foreign
relations during the Second World War solidified future Anglo-American cooperation and
built the foundation for improved policies toward France. Former British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill foresaw a continuation of the Anglo-American “special relationship”
beyond the Second World War. He described the special relationship as a “fraternal
association of the English-speaking peoples,” including the British Commonwealth and
Empire, which entailed “mutual security” through intelligence sharing and joint military
efforts.1 The American relationship with France was less certain after the United States had
recognized the Vichy government and regarded the Free French, under General Charles de
Gaulle, with skepticism. Additionally, France flirted with Eastern rapprochement for many
years. French leaders viewed Cold War relations between the United States and Soviet Russia
as “a transient state of affairs” and believed “that a more independent Europe could alleviate
the East-West divide in the long run.”2 France considered working to draw back the Iron
Curtain, but increased Soviet belligerence of Eastern European nations and policy toward
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Germany convinced French leaders to pursue a relationship with the West. Paris concluded
that “solving the German problem” entailed “rebuilding West Germany on Western terms and
establishing a separate West German democratic state closely integrated into Euro-Atlantic
institutions.”3 Before serious American collaboration with Britain and France could occur,
however, Europe would have to overcome the devastation caused by the Second World War.
Britain and Europe entered a period of economic recovery after the Second World
War, although historians have determined that the dismal view of the postwar European
economy has been exaggerated.4 The United States was invested in the economic recovery of
its Western allies because strong anti-Communist nations were essential components of
Soviet containment.5 With Britain, the United States first loaned $3.75 billion in 1946 after
the Truman administration discontinued its wartime Lend-Lease aid. The Anglo-American
loan allowed the United Kingdom to more easily transition back to a peacetime economy and
had the added bonus of “restor[ing] sterling to convertibility,” reviving the value of Britain’s
struggling currency in the global market.6 Beginning in 1947, the Marshall Plan affected
European countries aiming to rebuild their economies in the wake of the Second World War.
In order to receive American aid, the Marshall Plan necessitated that nations practice
mutually beneficial economic policies toward attaining economic growth and improved
foreign and cooperative trade.7 The overarching purpose of the Marshall Plan in the context
of American Cold War strategy was “the restoration or maintenance in European countries of
3
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principles of individual liberty, free institutions, and genuine independence,” promoted
through economic recovery.8
The United States divided Marshall aid unevenly amongst participant countries, and
each nation produced different results.9 America allocated the greatest portion of aid to the
United Kingdom in the amount of $2.8 billion. By this time, the British economy was already
quite healthy, and thus “Marshall aid amounted to no more than 2 percent of GNP overall.”10
France was in far greater need of Marshall aid than Britain, and yet the former received less.
Aside from the Second World War’s physically destructive effects, France entered the Cold
War with “an urgent political need for aid, as it was… facing a Communist challenge from
within.”11 Still, the United States allotted less Marshall aid to the French, but with the money
it did receive, France produced successful outcomes such as debt relief and industrial
expansion. In the first year alone, Marshall aid accounted for 6.5% of France’s GNP.12
French accomplishments under the Marshall Plan positioned the reconstructing nation as a
frontrunner to leading European integration; yet from an early point in the Cold War, the
United States set the precedent of regarding France as secondary to the United Kingdom
despite France’s demonstration that it could be a valuable partner in pioneering the new and
improved Europe.
The Schuman Plan of 1950 tested America’s juggling act of Britain and France.
French leaders Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman proposed the creation of a European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) to consolidate German and French coal and steel production.
The institution would be supervised by a supranational authority and required participating
8
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countries to surrender a degree of sovereignty. Key components of the ECSC included the
availability of “coal and steel... to member countries on equal terms” and “common trading
practices with outside countries.”13 The United Kingdom, although invited to join the ECSC,
rejected membership for reasons of its own national interest. First, British leaders resented
the nature of the offer as they were not given first notice and were eventually presented with
a French ultimatum to join.14 Second, London disliked the thought of surrendering any degree
of sovereignty to an organization based on federalism.15 Third, the United Kingdom’s
economic policies heavily relied on continuing relations with the British Empire and
Commonwealth, along with building a transatlantic economic relationship with America.16
The United States, however, favored the ECSC because it embodied containment of the East
through democratic unification of the West; America saw the ECSC as the predecessor to
eventual European unity.17 France headed European unity while Britain clung to its empire,
Commonwealth, and the special relationship with the United States. As European integration
progressed and the ECSC evolved into the European Economic Community (EEC), America
was torn between appeasing its British friends and supporting French leadership of Europe.
As French and British national interests continued to clash, the United States
encouraged Britain to align more closely with Europe so that maintaining the AngloAmerican special relationship could become compatible with European integration and the
benefits integration offered to America. European integration extended American ideals of
federalism, “political and economic rational efficiency,” and containment of Germany and
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the Eastern threat.18 Britain inched closer toward Europe with the projected European Free
Trade Area (EFTA) and applications of full EEC membership. In each of these
circumstances, the United Kingdom stipulated that it was only interested in joining Europe on
its own terms. France vetoed “Britain’s admission to the Common Market [which] signaled…
the end of America’s easy predominance in Western Europe.”19 The United States could no
longer feign support for Britain and its conditionalities – economically, the EEC was too
important to American Cold War strategy for the United States to continue placating British
attachment to its sovereignty and the Commonwealth.20 In the economic context of the Cold
War, the United States ultimately sided with the French after Britain failed to become a team
player. This was the only context, however, in which the Franco-American relationship
prevailed over the Anglo-American special relationship. Still, previous American preferential
treatment of the British over the French negatively impacted U.S. interests in European
integration and strained the U.S. relationship with France.
Collective Defense, Nuclear Cooperation, and Intelligence Sharing
Western Europe’s future depended not only on economic security but through
collective defense as well. In 1949, twelve Western nations, including the United States,
Britain, and France, signed the North Atlantic Treaty which established the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). The treaty, “a collective security pact,” required mutual
defense, in whatever manner a country deemed necessary, amongst member nations in
response to outside attack.21 NATO became an American Cold War tool in extending U.S.
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presence in Europe. In December, member nations devised the military strategy for
containment and reaction against possible Eastern attack. They concluded that “the European
states would provide the ground forces and the United States would contribute an ‘atomic
shield’: overwhelming air power and the ability to retaliate massively with atomic
weapons.”22 French leaders, however, grew concerned that an increasing American presence
in Europe posed irrefutable benefits to Western nations. Instead, they feared a possible
American quest for hegemony. When the United States proposed the formation of the
European Defence Community (EDC), “a U.S.-dominated European armed force” 23 and even
issued a joint Anglo-American ultimatum for ratification of the EDC, France rejected the
treaty.24 French rejection of the EDC infuriated Washington. Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles called for America “to reappraise its foreign policies [toward France] and to adjust
them to the resultant situation.”25 In a Policy Planning Staff (PPS) paper prepared by Leon
W. Fuller, the United States formulated its subsequent policy toward Europe under two
objectives:
(1) the strengthening of the deterrent effectiveness of the NATO military
establishment to a maximum degree (which would also increase its potential
effectiveness if war did come), and (2) halting any further trend to the disintegration
of the free European community and promoting its economic, political and
psychological strength through unity within itself and through closer ties with the
extra-continental NATO powers (UK, US, Canada).26
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As depicted in these objectives, American authorities still viewed a militarily integrated
Europe as an essential component of containment but believed that Europe might fail if not
guided by more progressive powers such as Britain. In meeting these objectives, Fuller
argued that the United States should take a gradual approach in its policies toward France and
Britain. Fuller recognized the strengths of America’s European allies but suggested they also
had inherent weaknesses through which they could be puppeteered. Fuller described “the
obvious weakness and incapacity of France” and the fragile nature of Franco-American
relations.27 He believed that the United States could “compel [France]” into a “reappraisal of
[its] position and policies,” fearing that without strong French backing European unity might
not succeed.28 Washington’s attitude toward Paris suggested that the United States required
an alignment of its own policies with French policies, and American government officials
believed they could manipulate the French into serving U.S. interests. Toward the United
Kingdom, Fuller suggested that the United States respectfully “employ [its] diplomatic
resources to induce Britain to work closely with her continental allies” without enacting
outright “pressure.”29 The United States revered British foreign policy but still wanted to
distort it to favor American ambitions. These differing approaches to France and Britain
highlight the contrast in the American relationships with each respective nation – the United
States saw the United Kingdom as its partner and near-equal while it took a condescending
view toward France.
The United States hoped to expand NATO into Europe’s nuclear arena. In the early
1960s, the American government proposed the creation of a multilateral force (MLF) for
Western Europe. In an attempt to cautiously “satisfy Germany’s nuclear aspirations”30 and
27
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consolidate European nuclear resources, the MLF entailed the U.S. “providing the European
NATO states with a fleet of surface vessels with armed… missiles” manned by “crews of
mixed nationalities.”31 The MLF embodied “economic and strategic rationality” with regard
to containment strategy.32 Above all, the MLF offered participating European nations the
“illusion” of nuclear control when, in reality, America was the only party with absolute
authority.33 By offering Europe the apparition of autonomy, the United States ventured to
solidify an MLF presence on the continent that Americans would ultimately direct. The
United Kingdom favored the MLF because final decisions rested in Washington’s hands;
Britain distrusted its continental neighbors, and London demanded that the American veto on
all MLF actions be upheld.34 Aside from anticipating the MLF would complement its own
nuclear program, the United Kingdom so deeply valued the special relationship with the
United States that it was willing to sacrifice nuclear sovereignty. France, however, felt
differently. France desired national, instead of supranational, nuclear forces which left
Germany without nuclear capabilities. French President Charles de Gaulle wished to contain
Germany through European integration in the economic arena, not in the nuclear arena.
Additionally, Paris resented London for clinging to Washington yet again, this time in the
context of the MLF. De Gaulle claimed that “London would ‘always be too intimately tied up
with the Americans,’” and refused to share power with the United Kingdom.35 To France,
granting Britain any control over European integration meant granting the United States that
same control. The French push for its own independent nuclear program in turn “challenged
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Washington’s centralized control of the West’s nuclear deterrent.”36 During MLF
negotiations, Franco-American relations came to a deadlock with the British stuck in the
middle. The project would fail due to French frustration and incompatibility with the special
partners.
The United States not only sought to strengthen its nuclear presence in continental
Europe but the United Kingdom in particular. Britain’s position as America’s partner in the
special relationship made it the optimal choice for American nuclear programs abroad. As
America developed its postwar relationship with Britain, questions of nuclear cooperation
arose. The United States took a cautionary approach immediately following the Second
World War with the 1946 McMahon Act which forbade Americans from “passing atomic
information to a foreign state.”37 As later outlined in a 1951 document, however, the Policy
Planning Staff viewed the United Kingdom as more than an ideological ally in “maintaining
the leadership of the free world” – the United States, the PPS noted, coveted “the use of
British bases” and aimed “to make the most effective and efficient use of [U.S. and U.K.]
total capabilities.”38 At the time these words strictly implied pooling military resources, but in
the same report, the PPS acknowledged that Britain would likely try to align its own atomic
energy program closer to the American program. The PPS recommended that the United
States would have to “assure that the U.S. and the U.K. programs [were] complementary and
also that the U.K. [had] available adequate information to permit judgments comparable to
[America’s] own” in terms of strategy.39 Washington made no concessions of nuclear secrets
but suggested that it was open to the possibility of future cooperation with London.
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The United States continued to loosen its restraints on nuclear information. In 1958,
Congress repealed the McMahon Act and amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in order
to allow the president “to give restricted data on atomic weapons only to those countries (like
Britain) that had made ‘substantial progress’ in the nuclear field in order to improve their
atomic weapons design, development and fabrication capabilities” as long as it did not
threaten national security.40 The United Kingdom was the only nation that met these vague
requirements. The special partners then extended their nuclear relationship through the
Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) which formalized and solidified
nuclear collaboration of research and development to the present day.41 The United States at
no point awarded this advantage to France. Washington limited its nuclear approach to Paris
while granting London every privilege it could afford.
The MDA paved the way for further nuclear cooperation between the United States
and Britain. By 1958, the United Kingdom’s own nuclear program was failing, and in 1960,
Eisenhower authorized the sale of Skybolt, an American air-launched missile, to Britain as a
replacement for its faltering Blue Steel and Blue Streak. In exchange, the United Kingdom
allowed the United States “to build a base for Polaris in Scotland and an early-warning radar
system” in northern England.42 Polaris, an American submarine-launched missile, became the
focal point of discussion during the 1962 Nassau summit in which U.S. President John F.
Kennedy and U.K. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan met after the American cancellation of
the Skybolt project. Macmillan found Polaris a promising investment and convinced Kennedy
to negotiate a deal. The prime minister advocated Britain’s worth as a nuclear ally to the
United States and argued that the “loss of Britain’s status as a credible, independent ally
John Baylis, “The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The Search for Nuclear
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could not benefit” America.43 By promoting Anglo-American nuclear interdependence so
strongly, Macmillan exacerbated the rift between the United Kingdom and France during
European integration negotiations. De Gaulle had not been invited to the Nassau dealings;
however, Kennedy also offered the sale of Polaris to France in an attempt to smooth relations
not only between Britain and France but between France and the United States. De Gaulle
interpreted the offer as a worthless insult since “France had neither the warheads nor the
submarines required for the Polaris missile.”44 The French president also rebuked the offer as
an American effort to further its strongholds in Europe.45 Nuclear negotiations between the
United Kingdom and the United States were sometimes rocky but resulted in a continuation
of the Anglo-American special relationship and further alienation of France.
Intelligence sharing further solidified the Anglo-American special relationship. The
United States and the United Kingdom shared a history of intelligence cooperation prior to
the Cold War; however, this aspect of the special relationship was not formalized until 1947
under the UKUSA agreement. The UKUSA agreement linked American, British, Australian,
New Zealand, and Canadian communications and signals intelligence organizations. Of
particular importance was the working relationship between Britain’s Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and America’s National Security Agency (NSA).
Together, the two intelligence organizations closely monitored national and international
activities that threatened British and American Cold War interests.46 This close monitoring of
nations included those of continental Europe which was supposedly France’s sphere of
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influence.47 During the 1946 negotiations of the UKUSA agreement, a top secret document
detailed the guidelines for intelligence interactions with “third parties” meaning “all
individuals or authorities other than those of the United States, the British Empire, and the
British Dominions.”48 Members of the UKUSA intelligence network agreed to maintain the
network’s secrecy from third parties. When intelligence coordination was required with third
parties, all UKUSA nations had to consent to such consultation with the guarantee that any
actions taken would not compromise the group’s disguise.49 Completely unbeknownst to
France, the United States and Britain grew very close through the intelligence sharing
component of the special relationship. The UKUSA secret affair provided the Americans and
British with yet another reason to prioritize each other over the French.
International Conflicts and Tests of Friendship
In 1956, the United Kingdom and France double-crossed America by executing
military action against Egypt after Egyptian leader Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal owned
jointly by the British and French. The United States reacted by advising the British and
French to pursue a diplomatic settlement with Egypt. The Eisenhower administration wished
“to keep the Third World open to Western, particularly American, influence… and protect
the huge stakes [in the Middle East] of American oil companies and minimize Arab
resentment of Western help to Israel” who became another aggressor of Egypt.50 Washington
feared that British, French, and Israeli military action against Egypt would result in colonial
wars and Soviet takeover of the Middle East. However, Britain and France, unbeknownst to
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, “Reassessing the Special Relationship,” International
Affairs 85, no. 2 (2009), 273.
47
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the United States, issued an ultimatum to Nasser to withdraw his troops from the canal and
proceeded to bomb Egypt after Nasser refused.51 President Eisenhower viewed British and
French actions as a violation of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.52 He was also disheartened
by the British betrayal of the Anglo-American relationship. Despite British decision-making
during the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower remained committed, at least in name, to maintaining the
special relationship. In a message to U.K. Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Eisenhower stated,
“Whenever, on any international question, I find myself differing even slightly from you, I
feel a deep compulsion to reexamine my position instantly and carefully.”53 Regardless of the
ongoing disagreements of 1956, Eisenhower felt compelled to reassure the British of their
priority status in American foreign policy. Washington did not ignore Paris but treated it as
an afterthought to London. Eisenhower blamed the French for initiating Israeli militarization
and, through diction, regarded the French as secondary in letters to Eden (e.g. “I think it is
important that our two peoples, as well as the French, have this clear understanding of our
common or several viewpoints.”).54 Because the United Kingdom did not want to find itself
ostracized from the United States, the British finally gave in to American pressure for peace
leaving the French no choice but to follow suit, much to their dismay.55
In 1962, the Kennedy administration faced its most challenging international
emergency with the missile crisis in Cuba. When determining his approach to the missile
crisis, Kennedy heavily relied on his Executive Committee (ExComm) for guidance in
decision-making. ExComm led Kennedy “to impose the quarantine after discovery of Soviet
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missiles in Cuba; to steer a middle course between air strikes and doing nothing; [and] to
finesse the eventual linkage between dismantling of the Soviet missiles and removal of
Jupiter missiles from Turkey.”56 However, members of Kennedy’s Executive Committee
were not exclusively American – “according to… the editors of the ‘Kennedy tapes’
(transcripts of recordings secretly made by JFK in the Oval Office and Cabinet Room),”
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and British Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore were “de
facto members.”57 These high-ranking British officials were more closely linked “to the
evolution of [American] policy” during the Cuban missile crisis than even the U.S.
legislature.58 Kennedy made many private telephone calls to Macmillan at his Downing
Street residence.59 The special partners discussed matters such as the implications of invasion
versus diplomacy.60 The British prime minister “took pride in the way he had asserted the
‘special relationship’ over… France.”61 Although historians dispute the extent of British
influence on American policymaking during the Cuban missile crisis, the United Kingdom
received substantial consideration compared to France. The United States failed to consult
with its continental European allies during the missile crisis. Upon meeting with Secretary of
State Dean Acheson following crucial American decision-making, President Charles de
Gaulle “greeted Acheson with the central question: ‘In order to get our roles clear… have
[you] come… to inform me of some decision taken by your President – or have you come to
consult me about a decision which he should take [?]’… Acheson replied, ‘I have come to
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inform you.’”62 De Gaulle realized an argument would prove pointless – the United States
would proceed as it saw fit without regard for French interests. The French president still lent
his “unconditional support” of the American position during the Cuban missile crisis with the
indispensability of “Western cohesion” against the Soviet threat in mind.63 Still, this incident
only added to French resentment of key American Cold War actions.64 The Anglo-American
special relationship undoubtedly triumphed over and stunted the struggling Franco-American
friendship during the Cuban missile crisis.
American foreign interests often clashed with British imperial interests; despite their
differences, however, the United States and the United Kingdom managed to resolve issues
of major contention. At the onset of the Cold War, Britain still retained colonial and
commercial influence in many areas of the globe including the Middle East where the Soviet
Union loomed on the periphery. The United States distrusted any form of imperialism other
than its own but recognized the need for continued British economic influence in areas
vulnerable to communist infiltration.65 In 1951, the United States voiced its support for a
Middle East Command through which the United Kingdom would “strengthen” and “exercise
responsibility” over the region.66 The United States only began to take control of Middle
Eastern affairs when it felt Britain was failing to secure the region against the Soviet threat. 67
In the case of Iran, “the United States found itself in a middleman position between British
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colonialism and Middle East nationalism.”68 The democratically elected Iranian Prime
Minister Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in
March 1951 prompting the United Kingdom to shut down its AIOC refinery. Iran “retaliated
by breaking off relations with Britain in October 1952.” 69 The United States felt that this
action exposed Iran to Soviet encroachment, especially as the British convinced American
policymakers that Mossadegh was becoming increasingly dictatorial, tolerant of communists,
and resistant toward relations with the United States.70 American officials thought Iran might
attract the Soviet Union “because of its key strategic location and large petroleum resources”
and decided to support the United Kingdom in its imperialistic Iranian endeavors largely
because the United States valued its “worldwide relations with the British.”71 Together,
American and British intelligence organizations successfully staged a coup (Operation Ajax),
overthrowing Mossadegh on August 22, 1953.72 In effect, the United States had allowed
British imperialism to conquer Iranian democracy. The Anglo-American relationship
withstood other trials in the Middle East; the Franco-American friendship nearly split over
matters in Indochina.
Unlike British imperialism which Americans accepted in many areas, the United
States abhorred French colonialism. This fundamental difference between American views of
British and French influence in the Third World sparked a chain of events that would cause
the Franco-American friendship to deteriorate. U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
“observed in May 1942 that ‘the French did not seem to be very good colonizers.’ French
conduct in Indochina, he suggested, ‘was at considerable variance with the general practice of
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Great Britain and the United States to encourage natives to participate in self-government to
the limit of their abilities.’”73 Ironically, Charles de Gaulle would later cite French pronationalism as a point of contention between France and the hegemonic United States.74 Early
relations between France and the United States nonetheless focused on American rigidity
against French colonialism. In the 1950s, the two nations held opposing views of the
escalating situation in Vietnam – “whereas U.S. leaders viewed the war principally as a Cold
War struggle against communism, their French counterparts saw it primarily as a campaign to
preserve colonial prerogatives.”75 Accordingly, the United States sought a decisive victory
over communism in Vietnam while France hoped to negotiate a settlement.76
Following the early years of conflict in Vietnam, American disdain for French
colonial policy eased; however, as the United States rapidly increased military intervention,
France retaliated. President de Gaulle felt that “the United States had backed France
insufficiently before 1954… and had mistakenly refused to allow the 1956 elections to
reunify the country.”77 He lashed out by extending a French hand to nationalists across the
globe battling “hegemonic superpowers.”78 In January 1964, France recognized Red China.79
De Gaulle went a few steps further when he expressed compassion for nations resisting
American suppression.80 France blamed the United States for Vietnam’s problems and
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viewed Vietnam as the only place where France could attempt to resist American hegemony.
French leaders criticized the United States for “trying to prevent the inevitable with massive
military force and intervention so complete as to eliminate any vestige of South Vietnamese
independence or French influence.”81 The United States repeatedly ignored de Gaulle’s
advice on matters in Indochina. The French president began to publicly voice his doubts
about the American role in Vietnam prompting a negative reaction against France in U.S.
foreign relations. Relations only worsened when, in 1965, de Gaulle wrote a sympathetic
letter to Ho Chi Minh.82 Ultimately though, French actions “had little impact on the course of
the war” and vocal opposition to American foreign policy was idle chatter.83 By 1966,
however, the Franco-American friendship had become so strained in Europe and the Third
World that de Gaulle pulled the French out of NATO; they have only rejoined in recent
years.84 From that moment forward in the Cold War, France pursued a policy of détente and
inched closer to the East. The United States and France still remained allies, but bad blood
between the two nations made future Cold War relations difficult.85

The tripartite power relationship of the United States, Britain, and France spanned
across many areas of Cold War foreign policy. America dominated both relationships and
attempted to manipulate them for its own benefit. When first establishing the postwar Angloand Franco-American relationships, the United States clung to Churchill’s idea of a “special
relationship” and swayed France into the Western alliance on American and British terms.
Suitably, the United States allocated more aid to the United Kingdom than to France when
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funding European recovery. France soon began to orchestrate European integration while
Britain chose to latch on to its special relationship with America. The United States found
itself between two countries with incompatible national interests. Ultimately, America backed
European integration but prioritized Britain in all other Cold War contexts. American leaders
relied on the United Kingdom to head collective defense initiatives and support U.S. nuclear
authority in Europe. The special partners also developed a relationship of nuclear
cooperation, a privilege not awarded to France. Whenever the United States and Britain made
concessions to their awkward partner, France expressed disinterest because it felt estranged
from the other powers. The Anglo-American special relationship grew below the surface
through intelligence sharing; the two became closer leaving little room for France. Britain
and France tested the tripartite relationship through the Suez Crisis. The United Kingdom
buckled under U.S. pressure leaving France alone and forced to comply. During the Cuban
missile crisis, America collaborated extensively with Britain and merely informed France of
the international emergency’s outcome. Finally, the United States respected British
imperialism in the Middle East and discredited French imperialism in East Asia. The FrancoAmerican friendship consistently failed in comparison to the Anglo-American special
relationship; the United States alienated France and nearly stressed the friendship to its
breaking point.
In 1972, the European Community finally welcomed the United Kingdom into its
ranks. C.L. Sulzberger, a Pulitzer Prize-winning foreign affairs correspondent for the New
York Times, argued that British entry into the EC meant a decisive split from the United
States and the special relationship.86 Sulzberger assumed that British entry into the EC
equated a realignment of the United Kingdom’s loyalties. This was not the case. In the same
article, Sulzberger acknowledged that although Britain could be puppeteered by “the apron
C.L. Sulzberger, “High Cost of Victory,” New York Times, November 12, 1972, accessed October
14, 2011, ProQuest (119361737).
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strings which bound it to the United States since” the Second World War, “Britain [was] a
special ally, favored even over France.”87 The United States earned the United Kingdom’s
loyalty and respect throughout the duration of the Cold War. Unfortunately, the closeness of
the special relationship damaged the Franco-American friendship. To be sure, the shaky
Anglo-French relationship made matters worse. Britain and France took a firm stance against
the United States when they deemed necessary; but in most cases, the British usually
succumbed to American wishes whereas the French would often challenge or defy American
pressure. France resented the Anglo-American relationship for altering French foreign policy;
France prided itself as an up-and-coming independent, world power, and the Anglo-American
relationship often destroyed that image. By prizing its relationship with the United Kingdom
so deeply, the United States damaged the French ego. On the Cold War stage, the Americans
played Dr. Frankenstein, and the French portrayed the monster – the United States was
responsible for French resistance to American hegemony. Although difficult to prove, had the
United States treated France with higher regard, the French might have better complied with
American Cold War policy. France kept Britain out of Europe for many years, rejected
several American proposals for European programs, and muddied Western predominance in
other areas of the world. These French actions impeded upon key components of American
Cold War strategy. Luckily, the United States managed to thrive without France immediately
by its side; however, years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and dissolution of the Soviet
Union, repercussions and continuities from these Cold War relationships can still be
observed.
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